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Abstract. The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple 
demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally 
strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, 
the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does 
not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is 
authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general thought is 
given support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to 
directly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in 
ostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our 
abilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our 
environment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem 
can be used to articulate this thought in more detail. 
Keywords: ostension, demonstratives, direct reference, tagging, this-predication. 
 
 
I. The Problem 
 
In what follows I will focus on two basic actions which we do in 
order to talk about things. The first would for instance consist in 
showing an object (o) to another person (A) and saying “food” to 
A. The other consists in saying “This is food.” with respect to the 
same object (o) while addressing A. 
The first case includes an ostension of o, while the second 
involves a demonstrative use of “this” to refer to o. 
I feel inclined to accept the following ideas with respect to 
these cases: 
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(1) The two cases are extremely similar. It could be said that 
in both cases what we do is to communicate that o is 
food, in roughly the same way. 
(2) In the second case, it seems very plausible to say that 
“this” refers to o. 
(3) In the first case, it seems rather awkward to say that the 
act of showing o to A refers to o. 
There seems to be a tension between (1), (2) and (3), but 
before spelling that out let me offer you some arguments for each 
of the three ideas. After I do that, I hope you will see more clearly 
what my problem is and how my tentative solution to it works.  
I will start with (3). Showing o to A and offering o to A 
appear to be similar actions, having A as addressee, both of which 
can be regarded as implicitly communicative (by contrast, 
throwing o at A to cause A to pay attention to it or shoving o in A’s 
pocket (or in a baby’s hand) would not usually be regarded as 
some form of communication)1. In both cases, one is using o while 
being involved in some form of communication, but in neither is o 
used as a sign. We could of course imagine a code according to 
which the demonstration of o or other similar actions performed 
on it might mean something to A (in the way in which a sign 
would), but the usual cases are not like this.  
An object could be used as a sign for itself, but such a use 
seems to require a special setting. Let us consider the following 
case. Suppose that I have two different looking rings, each being 
held in a wooden box. Each box has a small transparent window 
where a tag of the ring inside could be fitted. I chose, however, not 
to use any tag, but to place the ring inside the box such that it 
would be visible through the tag window. It could be said now 
                                                 
1  A simplified Gricean analysis of one of these actions would look like this: 
X is showing o to A with the intention that A pays attention to o, having 
also the intention the A notices X’s intention that A pays attention to o, 
and finally, the intention that A pays attention to o based on noticing that 
this is what X intends A to do. The offering case could be analyzed in a 
similar way. I call this analysis simplified because it follows (Grice 1957) 
and not (Grice 1969). 
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that when any of my rings is placed in its box such that it can be 
viewed through the tag window, the ring functions as a sign of 
itself. This could be disputed, of course, but at least it does not 
seem to be true of o when I am simply offering (or showing) it to A. 
I am not offering (or showing) A a sign of o, but o itself.  
Now, if o does not refer to itself when just shown to A, how 
could the act of showing o to A somehow refer to it? If this were 
true, it would follow that any (implicit) communicative action 
performed while using o would refer to o.  
Suppose that after taking her turn in a game of chess A 
explicitly questions the reason for my previous move. In reply, I 
ostensibly move one of my pieces and checkmate her king. By this 
I mean A to understand that the reason for my previous move was 
that it made my present move possible. I think that my checkmate 
move can be considered an implicit communicative action in such 
a context. In performing it I have used one of my pieces, but it 
would be extremely strange to say that in doing so I was referring 
to that piece2.  
One could, perhaps, reply that an ostensive gesture should 
refer to the demonstrated object, since a pointing gesture can refer 
to the demonstrated object and proper ostension (holding the 
object in your hand and showing it to the addressee of your action) 
cannot be very different. There are many different ways in which 
one could demonstrate an object to somebody. I could show a 
friend a new picture hanging on my wall by (gently) grabbing his 
head and turning it towards the picture. I could show my new dog 
to someone by calling it. To a blind friend I could present my new 
piano by playing on it. But even if we ignore the differences 
between such cases, it is disputable that when somebody 
demonstrates an object to another person the demonstrative act 
refers to that object. 
Cases of deferred reference – uttering “this is missing” to say 
that my big red coffee cup is missing, while pointing at the cupboard 
                                                 
2  Not even the usual description of my move (e.g. “Be7#”) would include a 
reference to the particular piece of chess I have used, in this case. 
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where I was famously keeping it – bring this into focus. The more 
important point here is, however, different. Not only can one point 
at something while having the intention to refer to something else, 
but we habitually point at things without having any intention to 
refer at all. I could point to o because I think, for whatever reason, 
that A has failed to notice o and it would be beneficial for A to 
notice o. Or I could point to a piece of bread when asked which 
one I want to buy in a bakery. Why should I be taken as referring 
to it when I am, in fact, just choosing it for my purchase?3  
So, if demonstrative gestures are performed without 
referring to the demonstrated object, why not say that their proper 
function is only to demonstrate something? The demonstrated 
object could, of course, be referred to by performing an additional 
act (i.e., a speech act), but the act of demonstrating something does 
not by itself have a referential function. In the case of what I have 
called a proper ostension, this seems rather intuitive. 
I will now move to (2). There are non-referential uses of 
“this”, but such uses will not concern us here. We take our case 
(“this is food”) as one in which the speaker wants to tell A that o is 
food and not to use o as a sample, in order to teach A the meaning 
of the word “food”. Apart from using “this” non-referentially, one 
could use it referentially and fail (“it was not food, but an optical 
illusion”), or pseudo-referentially (“this is my invisible ball”, said 
while pretending to toss an object in the air and catching it). Such 
cases would not show that “this” does not usually refer, of course. 
We can also acknowledge the vagueness of “this is food”. 
When I tell you that something is food, I do not want to tell you 
that only “this-right-now” is food. Neither do I want to tell you 
that “this-always” will be food. I might be said to refer to a vague 
temporal slice of o, but that in itself would not reject the idea that 
“this” refers to something. 
                                                 
3  Suppose that the piece of bread was on an accessible shelf. In that case, I 
would have taken it to the seller and paid for it directly. I take it that my 
pointing to it in the above example is just an attempt to reproduce that 
action with the seller's help.  
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In addition, “this” can be highly ambiguous, even when 
accompanied by a demonstration. A demonstration in itself can be 
ambiguous (as noted by Wittgenstein and Quine4), but the 
ambiguity of “this” does not simply come from the ambiguity of the 
accompanying demonstration. Suppose I am visibly focusing my 
attention on something and I notice that you have acknowledged 
what I am doing. Now, if I say “this was quite interesting”, there 
could still be an ambiguity with respect to my reference. Am I 
referring to an object, one of its properties or an event I was 
witnessing? Any referential use of “this” could be regarded as 
ambiguous in a similar fashion, but perhaps we could say that 
ambiguous reference is still reference, at the end of the day. 
Suppose, however, that someone still denied that by saying 
“this” we can actually refer to something. If demonstrative 
indexicals like “this” and “that” did not refer to objects (or just 
salient features from our environment), then how could we 
directly refer to anything at all? Names can be introduced 
descriptively (according to Kripke’s “Neptune” example5), but 
only if we have names introduced by a demonstrative indexical 
(“This is Uranus.”). General terms like “water” and “tiger” can 
directly refer to water and tigers only in virtue of being introduced 
with the help of a demonstrative (“This liquid is water.”). I doubt 
that one could claim that demonstratives do not refer and still hold 
that any other linguistic expression could refer directly. So if we 
do not want to give up direct reference altogether, I think we 
could accept the more mundane thought that at least in some 
simple situations (like the “this is food” case) one could use “this” 
to refer to something. After all, there would be no point in 
debating about how demonstratives get their referents, if we 
accepted that they do not have a referential function. 
Quine went from his idea of the inscrutability of reference to 
dismissing the notion of reference altogether. However, this seems 
too revisionary. Depending on the practice one is involved with, 
                                                 
4  See (Wittgenstein 1953, §§28-36) and (Quine 1950). 
5  See (Kripke 1980, 79, footnote). 
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one would rather engage with objects, some or other of their 
properties, events, behaviors, actions and so on. We can 
reasonably hope to overcome most (ontological) ambiguities by 
more talk, additional involvement in our practices and by further 
engaging ourselves in our environment.  
At this point you might wonder why I also hold that my two 
initial cases are similar. If the ostension of o does not refer to o in 
the first case, then the first case cannot be similar to the second, 
where “this” does indeed refer to o. Still, (1) expresses a strong 
intuition (shared by Frege and Russell, among others6) that in using a 
demonstrative word or a demonstrative gesture we are doing the 
same thing. Even if we thought (as Kaplan did initially7) that the 
use of a demonstrative word requires the use of a demonstrative 
gesture, this by itself would not show that the two are different 
(think of a light which can be turned on only by pressing a button 
two times). Moreover, a demonstrative like “this” could be used to 
demonstrate something without referring to it8 and the ostension 
of o in our first case can be said to be performed to refer to o, in 
some sense. After all, by showing o to A and uttering “food” we 
want to say of o that it is food. Before getting to this, however, let 
me consider other possible objections to (1). 
One general line of objecting to (1) might be considered to 
come from any of the various versions of contextualism and 
intentionalism according to which a demonstrative gesture is not a 
necessary condition for fixing the reference of “this” (in the same 
way in which it does not seem to be a necessary condition for 
fixing the reference of “here” or of “now”)9. But how could this 
                                                 
6  Russell’s treatment of egocentric particulars in (Russell 1940; Russell 1948) 
seems to suggest at least that ostension and “this” are used interchangeably 
to express knowledge by acquaintance. See also (Frege 1956, 296). 
7  See (Kaplan 1977). 
8  We can think, for instance, of the common internet practice of adding 
“this” or “also, this” to images or links shared to others. 
9  I take (McGinn 1981) and (Wettstein 1984) to be representative for the 
contextualist view and (Kaplan 1989), (Bach 1992) and (Perry 2009) to be 
representative for the intentionalist view. 
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account for a difference between our two initial cases? Suppose 
that in saying “This is food.” I succeed to refer to a particular 
object without performing a demonstrative gesture. Now suppose 
that A does not recognize my ostensive gesture and hears me 
saying “food” while holding o in my hand. A could still 
understand that I am saying of o that it is food. In fact, A could get 
it that I am telling her that o is food without recognizing that I am 
showing o to her10.  
I suppose that I would succeed in referring to o by saying 
“This is food.” in any situation in which I would notice that A is 
engaged mainly with o. Nothing prevents me to say “food” instead, 
in all these situations. The difference between the two cases, then, 
would rather be a syntactical one. “This is food” is a complete 
sentence, used (in our simple case) to predicate of a particular 
object that it is food. “Food” is not a complete sentence, although 
we might be tempted to consider it a short form of a complete 
sentence. I, for one, am inclined to say that by uttering a predicate 
(or even a proper name) while demonstrating an object one tags 
the object in case with the uttered word, and thus to distinguish a 
tagging from a predication, but I am ready to accept that the content 
of a tagging can be expressed by a predicative sentence.  
Another strategy for rejecting (1) could perhaps be to look at 
the differences between the ways in which one might fail to refer 
by using “this” and by demonstrating an object. Let us look at the 
following case11: Having left my lucky red ball on my desk, I enter 
my room at night, grasp the ball sitting on my desk, the color of 
which I cannot see, go to the kitchen and tell my parents’ guests 
“this is my ball”, only to open my hand and see a green ball 
belonging to my brother12, who had previously switched his ball 
                                                 
10  Recent empirical studies seem to suggest that children can learn new words 
by “shared attention” only, even in the absence of any “ostensive cues”. 
See, for instance, (Szufnarowska, Rohlfing, Fawcett, & Gredebäck 2014). 
11  This was inspired by (Kaplan 1978) – the “Carnap/Agnew” scenario – and 
(Reimer 1992) – the “my keys” scenario. 
12  The use of “this” to refer to something which is not accessible at the time 
of the utterance, but only afterwards, is more familiar in the case of textual 
GHEORGHE ŞTEFANOV 14 
for mine. I am eight years old and have just failed not only in 
showing the guests my lucky red ball, but also in referring to it by 
a simple demonstrative. In addition, it could be argued that my 
ostensive gesture has failed in a different way from my use of 
“this”. As a matter of fact, by saying “this” I did refer to the green 
ball I was holding in my hand. It is only that what I was saying 
was false. By contrast, I did not succeed to demonstrate my red 
ball to my parents’ guests. 
But is this really so? After all, we were not comparing the 
demonstrative use of an ostension with the referring use of a 
demonstrative, but the use of an ostension and of a demonstrative 
to refer to something. In the case discussed above, if I “succeed” in 
referring to the ball in my hand by saying (falsely) “This is my 
ball” to the guests, I cannot see why I shouldn’t be able to do the 
same by showing them the ball in my hand and saying “my ball”.  
Generally speaking, I cannot think of a case in which one 
would fail (or succeed) in communicating that o is food (or 
anything else) only by doing one of the two – saying “this is food” 
with respect to o or demonstrating o and saying “food”. In 
addition, most of the phenomena discussed with respect to “this” 
(deferred reference, predicative use, and even anaphoric use) 
could be replicated in the case of an ostension13.  
One other objection I can think of is based on the fact that 
one can use a complex demonstrative like “this red ball” but not a 
“complex ostension”. One could, of course, demonstrate a red ball, 
say “red ball” and then add “mine”, but while that would amount 
to tagging the demonstrated object as red and as a ball, it could be 
denied that in saying “this red ball is mine” one predicates of “this” 
that it is a red ball. Nevertheless, I suspect that in order to support 
                                                                                                              
deixis: “Let me tell you this…”(The phrase “textual deixis” is borrowed 
from (Lyons 1977). 
13  Suppose I repeat some ostensive gesture made by you, without actually 
showing the object you were initially holding in your hand and showing 
to me (while saying “food”) and I say “bitter”. Given the appropriate 
circumstances, I can be said to have tagged o as bitter. This appears to be 
quite similar to the anaphoric use of a demonstrative. 
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that view one would have to say that “this red ball” works more 
like a definite description and not like a “true demonstrative”. 
So why did I accept (3), then? Well, because I had the strong 
intuition that a simple ostension of an object does not refer to the 
object in case. If we tried to device a function from the ostensive 
gesture to the object in case, what we will get would not be a 
referent, but a demonstratum14.  
My problem, then, was that although I had good reasons to 
accept (1)-(3), I did not see at first how I could do that without 
running into a contradiction. If demonstrating o and saying “this” 
of o did play the same semantic function, then a speaker, by doing 
any of the two, would either refer to o or not. One could not refer 
to o in one way, but not in the other way. If this was possible, then 
the two would not have the same semantic function. 
 
 
II. The Solution 
 
Let us move now to the part where I try to device a solution to this 
problem. My current suspicion is that the problem appears 
precisely because we apply a particular concept of reference to the 
“ostensive tagging” case. Perhaps this concept comes from 
Kripke’s analysis of direct reference for the case of proper names, 
but its roots can be found in the works of Frege, Russell, and in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reference is seen as a function, getting 
the name (or other referring expression) as its argument and 
producing the referent as its value. Saying that proper names are 
rigid designators, for instance, amounts to saying that the referring 
function produces the same value for a name in every possible 
world (in which the name bearer exists). Much of the debate on 
demonstrative reference can be also described in these terms. The 
problem is to say how the referring function works, what it takes 
as an argument (“this”, a token of “this”, an utterance of “this”, 
demonstrative gestures, speaker’s intentions, contextual cues, 
                                                 
14  I think (Nunberg 1993) has some very convincing arguments for this point. 
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salient features of the environment, various tuples of the previous 
things etc.) and how it produces a value (a demonstratum, an 
intended demonstratum, an intended referent, an intended 
speaker-referent etc.). 
Proper ostension, when used to perform a speech act 
centered on an object, does not work like that. So instead of 
conceiving the relation between the ostensive act which is part of 
some tagging and the tagged object as a function from the first to 
the second, I propose that we do something different. 
Let us simply say that in showing o and saying “food” one is 
using o to tag it as food. More generally, we could say that when 
an ostension is performed as part of a speech act, the 
demonstrated object itself is used and the speech act is performed on 
it. After all, when we perform other actions we have no difficulty 
to talk about objects acted upon. Tagging o as food to A is to 
perform a verbal action on o, the addressee of which is A, the 
difference between such an action and that of offering o to A being 
one of a degree only.  
Performing an ostension on o is not a necessary condition to 
tag o as food, of course. If A is already acting on o, there is no need 
to show o to A. In demonstrating o to A one is trying to make A 
involve herself in some empirical action15 performed upon o 
(looking at o, listening to o, touching o etc.), but if that condition is 
already satisfied, there is no need to demonstrate o anymore.  
The mentioned condition could be satisfied in several ways. 
I could be involved with o in some way and A could get involved 
(cooperatively, perhaps) with what I was doing (watching o, 
digging o out of the ground, talking about o etc.). Other times o 
could be a salient feature of our environment, such that we both 
engage into some empirical action having o as object. Now, the 
transition from doing implicit communicative actions on o 
(shooting at it, pointing at it, inviting one another to examine it, 
carrying it together etc.) to the performance of explicit 
communicative actions on o (tagging it as “food” or “danger” etc.) 
                                                 
15  For my use of “empirical action” see (Ştefanov, forthcoming). 
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is a fine one, but we need not be concerned about that right now. 
From a certain point on in that transition, at least, we can safely 
say that we refer to o by the explicit communicative actions we 
perform on it. 
The problem of determining what thing(s) we are acting on 
is still unsolved, but this is not specific to the use of demonstrative 
gestures (or demonstratives like “this”, for that matter). In this 
respect, the problem is the same in the case of a non-
communicative action. What is acted upon when I am using a 
water pump to send water into the cistern of a house, thus 
poisoning the inhabitants?16 Here, as in the case of determining the 
reference of “this”, the answer can be provided by talking about 
my intentions, the context of my action, the conceptual content of 
my action being made explicit in the descriptions (D) under which 
I am ready to accept that I have done D etc.17 
A different problem is that of determining whose actions 
should count in determining what object are we talking about. I 
could ask you “Mine?” or “Is that mine?” with respect to an object 
you are fumbling with and I cannot see. Since my question is 
addressed to you (A), it seems that I can successfully use the object 
you are acting upon to ask it.  
What if both of us were acting on different objects? Suppose 
you are reading a book and I am trying to boil an egg. If I say “this 
will be tasty” to you, I seem to be referring to my egg and not to 
your book. However, if I did nothing to get you involved into 
what I was doing, it seems that I was, after all, inadvertently 
saying of your book that it will be tasty. If I still claim that I was 
referring to my egg, than perhaps that is because an ambiguity not 
in the reference of “this”, but with respect to the addressee of my 
utterance. Did I say to you that this (i.e. your book) will be tasty or 
was I just telling myself that this (i.e. my egg) will be tasty? 
                                                 
16  I am borrowing this example from (Anscombe 1963, 41). 
17  In this respect, I see the more recent debates about how the reference of a 
demonstrative is fixed as opposing conceptualists to anti-conceptualists. 
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If we are on a crowded beach and I say “That is a fine 
looking young man.”18, perhaps I am using “that” as a means to 
say something of the young man I am looking at (or thinking of), 
but then I must be talking to myself. If I claim that I am talking to 
you, I am not referring to the man in question, but only denoting 
him by way of a description like “the man I am talking about”19. So 
perhaps the rule should be that I directly refer to the object the 
addressee of my speech act is acting on, after all. 
You might have noticed, by now, that instead of doing 
things the other way around I want to model the use of “this” to 
predicate something of an object after the more primitive case of 
ostensive tagging. In doing so I also hope I am more faithful to our 
natural history, since it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the 
demonstrative use of “this” has evolved from that behavior. 
We can agree, of course, that an actual demonstration is not 
necessary either for “ostensive” tagging, or for the “demonstrative” 
use of “this”. Still, an ostension and an utterance of “this” can be 
used to demonstrate an object without referring to it and both tagging 
and this-predication are usually accompanied by demonstrations. 
So, in order to sum up the previous considerations, we can list the 
following ideas: 
(i) Both in tagging and in this-predication we use an object 
directly to say something about it. Such explicit 
communicative actions are usually accompanied by 
demonstrations, but they need not be. 
(ii) A constitutive condition for performing both explicit 
communicative actions is that their addressee is 
performing an empirical action on the object we use for 
tagging or this-predication. 
                                                 
18  This case is inspired by (King 2014). 
19  Here perhaps one could be tempted to say that “that” was token-reflexive. 
In any case, Nunberg’s (1993) claim that indexicals have a descriptive use 
could be extended to some uses of demonstratives too. If I say “I thought 
this was mine” of the green ball I am holding in my hand I do not want to say 
that I thought of this ball (the green ball belonging to my brother) that it was 
mine, but only that I thought that the ball I was holding in my hand was mine.  
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(iii) A success condition for performing both explicit 
communicative actions is that their agent and their 
addressee get to cooperate in acting on the same object.  
(iv) Demonstrations (either by ostension, or by “this”) are 
implicit communicative actions (the explicit form of 
which would be “look at this!” or, more generally, 
“engage yourself perceptually with this!”). As such, one 
can demonstrate an object without referring to it (that is, 
without using it to perform a speech act or some explicit 
communicative action). 
(v) More generally, all speech acts performed directly on an 
object (acted upon by the addressee and with respect to 
which both the speaker and the addressee can be said to 
cooperate), regardless of the fact that their syntactic structure 
includes an object handle (i.e. “this”) for the purpose of 
predication or not, are a basic form of reference. 
Based on these ideas, the solution to my problem should be 
obvious. We agree to (1) since, according to (i)-(iii) and (v), the 
difference between our two initial cases was only a syntactic one. 
We agree to (2) since, for the same reasons, by uttering “this is 
food” we actually use o directly to predicate that it is food. We 
agree to (3) since, according to (iv), the ostension of o does not 
refer to o. I did refer to o by using it to tag it as food, given that my 
addressee was perceptually involved with it and accepted my 
cooperation with respect to it, but I did not refer to o by just 
showing it to my addressee. 
 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
Now, I do not expect you to simply agree to this solution, of 
course. Both my problem and my solution to it might have just 
grown out of an acute lack of academic interaction (and since we 
are on this topic, an extremely limited access to the relevant 
literature should be mentioned as well). Nevertheless, let me just 
point, for now, to the general direction my view here is heading to. 
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First, I might seem to claim that the use of “this” is in fact 
unimportant for reference, since “this” is just a syntactical feature 
and has no real semantic import. What I actually want to say, 
however, is that what we do when we say that “this is food” is to 
use some object directly to say that it is food (this is not very 
different from Kaplan’s initial idea that the referent of a 
demonstrative is part of the proposition expressed by the sentence 
containing it). We could do the same thing without using “this” on 
pain of losing predication and be left with the more rudimentary 
tagging. I am reluctant to talk about the relation between “this” 
and “its referent” because I do not think that basic reference should 
be conceived as a mathematical function from some linguistic 
objects to some natural features of our environment. (I am, after 
all, an anti-representationalist.) But if one wanted to talk like this, 
one could, perhaps, say that true demonstratives get their 
reference by functioning as handles to the object empirically acted 
upon by the addressee. So their character (to use Kaplan’s 
vocabulary) is given by something like: “the x, such that A is 
empirically acting on x”. One could, of course, be mistaken about 
what object the addressee of one’s utterance is (or will be) looking 
at, touching etc., but that would not be a failure of reference, in my 
opinion. I would rather call it a “failure of cooperation.” 
Finally, I think that the bigger picture suggested here is as 
follows. Our ability to refer directly to features from our 
environment and our related cognitive abilities come from the fact 
that we act in our environment and in doing so we cooperate to 
each other. Non-communicative and communicative actions are 
intertwined together in our practices. This guarantees us a strong 
relation between what we say and what we are talking about. We 
are part of our environment and we are actively involved with it 
from within through our actions, of which our speech acts are only 
a species. Getting from using an object in a non-communicative 
action to using the same object in an implicit communicative 
action and then in an explicit one is less mysterious than getting 
from a mental object (be it an intention to refer, the meaning of a 
linguistic expression, the character of an indexical or whatever) to 
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a referent. This does not necessarily mean that we must abandon 
conceiving reference as a relation from a word to an object, but 
that concept of reference should perhaps be built out of our basic 
referential practices or abilities20. 
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